This study shows how venture capital investors can identify potential biases in multi-year management forecasts before an investment decision and derive significantly more accurate failure predictions. By advancing a cross-sectional projection method developed by prior research and using firm-specific information in financial statements and business plans, we derive benchmarks for management revenue forecasts. With these benchmarks, we estimate forecast errors as an a priori measure of biased expectations. Using this measure for our proprietary dataset on venture-backed start-ups in Germany, we find evidence of substantial upward forecast biases. We uncover that firms with large forecast errors fail significantly more often than do less biased entrepreneurs in years following the investment. Overall, our results highlight the implications of excessive optimism and overconfidence in entrepreneurial environments and emphasize the relevance of accounting information and business plans for venture capital investment decisions.
Introduction
" […] optimistic bias can be both a blessing and a risk […] " -Kahneman 2011, p. 255.
Prior research emphasizes the crucial role of optimism for the foundation of new firms (Koellinger et al. 2007, Hmieleski and Baron 2009) . These studies highlight the importance of optimism as a stimulus of entrepreneurial activity. A stimulus, prior studies also associate with higher efforts by the entrepreneur, which positively affect a firm's performance (Bitler et al. 2005, Puri and Robinson 2007) . However, previous research also illustrates that extreme optimism can lead to "seemingly irrational decisions" and that failures of firms may result from highly optimistic judgments of risks and opportunities (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993, Puri and Robinson 2007) . This should be of particular concern for venture capital investors when unreasonable optimism of the entrepreneurs regarding the future exogenous prospects of the start-up comes along with overconfidence in own (relative) abilities (Camerer and Lovallo 1999 , Lowe and Ziedonis 2006 , Baker et al. 2007 , Moore and Healy 2008 . Research on large corporations provides evidence for significant corporate investment distortions due to an overconfident management team (Malmendier and Tate 2005) . In this regard, tension arises along the implications of (extreme) biases in management forecasts for venture capital investments. How can investors identify potentially biased or even delusional overoptimistic and overconfident entrepreneurs, ideally before an investment decision? Do excessive optimism reduce or increase failure risks?
Key questions for venture capital investors as prior studies demonstrate that venture-backed startups face significant risks of failure (e.g., Ruhnka and Young 1991 , Gompers 1995 , Kahneman 2011 . Our insights may help entrepreneurs and investors to rethink the relevance of reliable projections for future firm performance and lead to a new approach for validating management revenue forecasts (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993, Delmar and Shane 2003) . Furthermore, our research may even be valuable for contract design and the setting of suitable milestones by investors (Aghion and Bolton 1992 , Kaplan and Strömberg 2003 , De Bettignies 2008 . Our paper links overoptimism and overconfidence in management forecasts to the analysis of new firm survival by using a novel measure for identifying biases in revenue forecasts of entrepreneurs at the time of the investment. For this purpose, we advance a cross-sectional projection method for future revenues used by Armstrong et al. (2007) to introduce the "rolling historically-grounded conditional projection method" (rHGC-projection method), see also Demers (2007) .
For the development of the rHGC-projection method as well as for our failure prediction models we employ a hand-collected and uniquely comprehensive dataset of 178 venture capital investment rounds in 123 start-up firms in Germany. This sample allows us to control for several accounting, management team and market environment covariates, which exhibit significant effects on failure risks of venture-backed start-ups in prior research (e.g., Altman and Narayanan 1997 , Hand 2005 , Pompe and Bilderbeek 2005 .
Our empirical tests show that our rHGC-projections come very close to ex-post realizations, while management forecasts are highly overestimated. Our cross-sectional rHGC-projection method, which builds on historical data from all firms in the dataset, allows for much more reliable revenue projections than individual management forecasts. Thereby, we provide venture capital investors with a measure of potential forecast biases, which can be applied before an investment decision. When we consider this forecast biases measure as a determinant in comprehensive failure prediction models, we observe that forecast biases are associated with significantly higher failure risks. Consequently, our study sheds light on the relevance and implications of management forecast biases for venture capital investment decisions.
Literature Review and Empirical Predictions
Optimism is the "engine of capitalism" and also of great importance for the decision to start a new venture (Koellinger et al. 2007, Hmieleski and Baron 2009) . Entrepreneurs show a great belief in the future prospects of their venture idea and personal abilities to found a venture despite the well known challenges for new firms (Cooper et al. 1988 , Dennis and Fernald 2001 , Landier and Thesmar 2009 . Their optimism regarding the environmental prospects for the firm as well as their confidence in own strengths can have two effects. On the one hand, this behavior may even increase the efforts of the entrepreneurs and positively affect the performance of the start-up (Taylor and Brown 1988 , Bitler et al. 2005 , Puri and Robinson 2007 , Gervais et al. 2011 . This suggests that a pessimistic management team may even lead to higher failure probabilities. On the other hand, optimism can turn to excessive optimism and confidence to overconfidence. Certain studies show that some level of optimism and confidence is desirable, while too much optimism and confidence bears significant risks for a firm's performance (Camerer and Lovallo 1999 , Malmendier and Tate 2005 , Baker et al. 2007 , Puri and Robinson 2007 . For instance, a firm may even underestimate the competitive response or have too high capital expenditures at an early stage as a result of the overly optimistic outlook. Recent research investigates the implications of risk attitudes for entrepreneurial survival (Caliendo et al. 2010) . For assessing risk attitudes, Caliendo et al. (2010) use results from a large country-wide panel survey regarding the explicit willingness of the founders to take risks. Furthermore, the authors derive inferences from conventional lottery measures. In contrast, our research solely builds on common due diligence data, which is available for an investor before an investment decision. By investigating forecast biases, we try to explicitly investigate the implications of overoptimism and overconfidence on failure risks in entrepreneurial environments. This area remains largely unexplored in prior research. To analyze this relationship we build on prior research, which establishes that overestimated revenue forecasts can signal (over-)optimism of the forecasting management team (e.g., Statman and Tyebjee 1985 , Kahneman and Lovallo 1993 , Armstrong et al. 2007 ).
We therefore apply biases in management revenue forecasts as a proxy for optimism and confidence.
Based on prior research, we expect that overestimated management forecasts exhibit a significant effect on failure risks. In particular, we hypothesize that extreme biases result in higher failure probabilities (Camerer and Lovallo 1999, Puri and Robinson 2007) . However, as we anticipate positive and negative effects of optimism on failure risks we do not provide a direction of the effect.
In our analyses, we control for several covariates. Research on potential drivers of failure risks is inherent to the science of business management and accounting (Altman and Narayanan 1997, Agarwal and Taffler 2008) . Moreover, the interest of research in survival chances and failure prediction models for smaller firms has recently increased (e.g., Shepherd 1999, Pompe and Bilderbeek 2005) . Prior research identifies several determinants of failure prediction, which we aim to control for. Selected accounting information should provide information on the "health-status" of a firm (Altman 1968 , Beaver 1968 , Ohlson 1980 , Beaver et al. 2005 . In our analyses, we include the cash/total assets ratio and the level of revenues from the most recent financial statement immediately prior to the investment. Furthermore, we consider, whether the firm was unprofitable or profitable in the financial year preceding the investment.
Based on the findings of prior research we argue that firms with higher cash/total assets levels, higher revenues and profitable firms should bear lower failure risks for venture capital investments (Altman 1968 , Ohlson 1980 , Begley et al. 1996 , Pompe and Bilderbeek 2005 ). In addition to the level of revenues, we also control for size in terms of the number of employees. Amongst others, larger start-ups should achieve operations, which are more cost competitive with that of larger firms and thus, less likely to fail (Mata and Portugal 1994 , Huyhebaert et al. 2000 , Lussier and Halabi 2010 . However, a higher headcount is also related to higher expenditures. This effect may even be of particular importance as we already control for size by considering the level of revenues. Overall, we do therefore not present a clear prediction, whether a higher number of employees increases or reduces failure risks in our setting.
Additionally, characteristics of the founding team should play a crucial role (Macmillan et al. 1985, Schefczyk and Gerpott 2000) . In this regard, familiarity with the founding of ventures should help the management team to better identify and mitigate risks for the start-up and hence, reduce failure risks (Duchesneau and Gartner 1990 , Brüderl et al. 1992 , Dyke et al. 1992 ). For founders with negative prior start-up experiences from failed business ventures, the "grief recovery process" becomes important and may even affect the chances for a firm's survival (Shepherd 2003) . Nevertheless, also for these cases, we would still expect positive implications of start-up experience for survival chances as a result of learning effects. Furthermore, the composition of the team may even make a difference. We control for this aspect, by investigating the implications of team completeness. A complete management team (in our study consisting at least of a CEO and a CSO) should more likely be able to develop superior products, react to changing market trends and attract investors, thus reduce risks of failure (Roure and Keeley 1990 , Zacharakis and Meyer 2000 , Beckman et al. 2007 , Franke et al. 2008 . We further expect that the existence of cooperation partners decreases failure risks, as organizational ecology theory suggests that "affiliated businesses may use the resources of their partner or parental firms, seek advice from them, build on their credit, etc." (Brüderl et al. 1992 , p. 230, see also Gans et al. 2002 , Lussier and Halabi 2010 . Although this theoretical hypothesis is only partially confirmed by empirical analyses in prior research (Brüderl et al. 1992, p. 236, Brüderl and Preisendörfer 1998) , we would assume that cooperation partners should increase the survival chances of start-ups.
When the business concept of a start-up relies on a truly innovative product and/or process (as classified by the lead investor) the firm acts as a pioneer instead of a follower. On the one hand, this results in higher uncertainty and thus, higher risks of failure of the venture (Mitchell 1991 , Shepherd 1999 ). On the other hand, an innovative product and/or process can be an important competitive advantage (e.g., Robinson 1990 , Cefis and Marsili 2006 , Petty and Gruber 2011 . Overall, the cited findings of prior studies do not provide a clear prediction for the direction of the effect and it is our intention to shed further light on this question (see also Franco et al. 2009 ). Another criterion for the assessment of failure risks of start-ups may even be the type of investor (Mata and Portugal 2002 , Hand 2005 , 2007 . In our study, we control, whether a corporate lead investor arranges the investment. In this regard, two arguments are of particular importance. Hand (2007) , Gompers and Lerner (1999) , and Dushnitsky and Shapira (2010) hypothesize that corporate lead investors are less engaged and incited in business development and the monitoring of their venture capital investments. This would result in higher risks of failure. On the contrary, the specific industry knowledge and access to further resources of a corporate lead investor should make it easier to identify potential risks prior to investment decisions and decrease failure risks. Overall, these conflicting arguments prevent an explicit empirical prediction (see also Park and Steensma 2012).
Additionally, we control for the overall market environment in the form of market growth prospects for the venture and funds inflows in the venture capital industry. These initial founding conditions at the time of the investment influence the likelihood to obtain funding (Tyebjee and Bruno 1984 , Rea 1989 , Zacharakis and Meyer 2000 and afterwards also affect the survival chances for the venture (see Bamford et al. 2000) . In this regard, higher overall growth expectations for the relevant market of the start-up (as defined by the lead investor) should decrease risks of failure (Mata and Portugal 1994, Zacharakis et al. 1999) . With reference to fund inflows in the VC industry, one may even argue that more money in the market should strengthen the entrepreneur's ability to acquire suitable financing (Zacharakis et al. 1999) . On the other hand, we expect that "too much money chasing too few deals" (Gompers and Lerner 2000, p. 282) can result in a suboptimal capital allocation and the financing of less promising business ideas with generally higher failure risks. Weighing these arguments, we assume that the "demand pressure" in phases with high inflows in the German venture capital industry should go in hand with higher failure risks for the firms financed in these times. Lastly, we also control for industry to consider the evidence on industry-specific differences between start-up firms (Platt and Platt 1991, Audretsch and Mahmood 1995 , Thornhill and Amit 2003 , Lussier and Halabi 2010 . Our empirical analyses will show, whether we observe the anticipated effects of the control variables and whether we are still able to identify a significant effect of forecast biases on failure risks of venture-backed start-ups. th , 2011). We classify businesses that go into bankruptcy or "cease operations with resulting losses to creditors" as failure (Watson and Everett 1993 , Lussier 1995 , see also Dun & Bradstreet 2011 . Owing to the sensitive nature of the analyzed data in this project we went into a research cooperation agreement with KfW to guarantee that all analyzed data will be collected strictly anonymously and considered confidential. Within the venture capital program, entitled as ERP Start Fund, KfW invests as a co-investor in innovative firms on a pari passu approach, i.e., on equal terms and at the same time as the lead investor and other investors. 1 Lead investors in our sample are not reduced to German investors. We find several among them from the United States, Europe and the Middle East. Being a purely financial co-investor, KfW does not carry out individual due diligence but rather bases its investment decision on the lead investor's internal documentation and investment evaluation. As a consequence, KfW has access to all relevant internal documents regarding the investment opportunity. For example, national and international 1 KfW enters into participations in start-ups jointly with private investors, where, in general, investment partners invest equal amounts. KfW faces identical legal protection and pay-off rights. Put differently, KfW and the VC investors share the same risk in every deal. Consider the case of a start-up firm needing EUR 2 million in a financing round. This amount is financed 50% by a private VC investor and 50% by KfW. In case this company fails, both investors (the private VC and the KfW) will lose EUR 1 million. In other words, the VC investor has at least the same amount at stake as KfW and, regarding the upside potential, the VC also has to share the payoffs and other legal control rights with KfW.
lead investors cover the following information within their deal evaluation: complete due diligence data comprising among other items, historical financial statements, team characteristics, and non-financial information such as prior founding experiences of the management team. Based on these documents we are able to follow the complete investment process for the involved venture capital investments. We provide more information about the program in Appendix A.
Sample Selection Issues
In this section, we address potential selection biases of our sample. We only see investments in which the KfW Bankengruppe participates as a co-investor. Therefore, our sample may be biased towards deals for which the lead investor is interested in having KfW as the syndication partner. This may even raise two concerns: first, being a purely financial co-investor, KfW, and with that our sample, may suffer from risks of adverse selection. Lead investors could strive to share only those deals they deem less promising.
Regarding this argument, we are only partly concerned as the investor himself invested under identical conditions. Astute investors will simply not invest once they deem an investment not promising. Second, one may challenge why KfW compared to other investors was asked to join the syndicate. With regard to this argument we find that on average, over 85% of all investigated transactions are syndicated with at least two further investors in addition to KfW. Furthermore, on average four investors syndicate within each of the 178 analyzed transactions. In this context, it is important to mention that syndication does not only take place for risk diversification. Moreover, syndication adds value in the screening and monitoring process as additional venture-capitalists only invest in a start-up and help the company succeed when they also get to a positive decision regarding the venture (see Brander et al. 2002 , Hochberg et al. 2007 , Ferrary 2010 . Overall, we acknowledge that the sample is somewhat selective and the extent of any bias is unknown. For the validation of our results, we therefore apply a Heckman selection model as an additional robustness test (Heckman 1979, Van de Ven and Van Praag 1981) but do not obtain a statistically significantly different outcome regarding our covariates of concern (see Section 5). Finally, unlike in many previous studies, our sample is not biased by any kind of survivorship issues or other selfselection problems (see Dietrich 1984 , Zmijewski 1984 ). We do not require the firm data from the period between the first financing round and the IPO and no particular venture capital firm has opted to be part of the study. Prior research illustrates that forecast biases increase over time (Armstrong et al. 2007 ).
Data Description
Therefore, we have to take into account that not all firms in our sample consistently provide one-to fiveyear-ahead forecasts. 
Empirical Analyses
We intend to analyze the relevance and implications of forecast biases for failure risk assessments of venture-backed start-ups. In real-life investment situations, investors can only consider due diligence information that is available before an investment decision. Hence, we build all our models solely on data from preceding financial statements or business plans submitted until the year of investment. In our analyses, we apply revenue forecast errors as a proxy for overoptimism and overconfidence of the entrepreneurs. We define the forecast error of a firm i in round r for forecast horizon h as: 
For estimating these forecast errors we need a suitable benchmark. Therefore, we introduce the rolling HGC-projection method. The model approach builds on the work of Armstrong et al. (2007) , see also Demers (2007) . These authors apply a cross-sectional projection model mainly based on information regarding historic revenues and firm age to project future revenues of venture-backed start-ups (regarding the recently increasing interest in cross-section models also see Lorek and Willinger 2009, Heinrichs et al. 2011 ). In our study, however, we use a "rolling" approach. Hence, we estimate the projections for each year only based on the information, which is available up to that specific year. For example, when we estimate the rHGC-projection for 2005 we only use financial data up to 2004 and information from business plans submitted until 2005 (we thereby assume that the information in the business plans (i.e., number of employees, firm age) is available at the beginning of the year). In every model, we also control for industry (see Schmalensee 1985 , Fairfield et al. 2009 ). Demers (2007) criticizes the model in Armstrong et al. (2007) particularly because of the "weak" explanation levels for firms, for which an investor does not have any information on historic revenues. For these start-ups, Armstrong et al. (2007) only consider firm age to project future revenues. In our study, we are able to extend the work of Armstrong et al. (2007) and also incorporate the number of employees for these observations. We choose employees as the proxy for last-year revenues for different reasons. Firstly, unreported tests show a highly significant Spearman correlation of 0.66 between employees and revenues, which is comparable to the correlation between last-year's revenues and revenues (0.74) for the 117 observations where all three measures are available. Furthermore, prior research highlights the interchangeability of revenues and the number of employees as general proxies for size (Agarwal 1979, see also Dalton and Kesner 1983) .
Figures 1 summarizes our model approach: 
Model 1b cases (~90% of all investment rounds) we apply model 1b to obtain one-year-ahead projections. For twoto three-year-ahead projections we then always employ model 2, which considers the one-year-ahead model projection from model 1a or model 1b as a proxy for the lagged revenues covariate.
----- [TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE] ----- Table 2 results from investments without financial statements for the year of the investment round (e.g. when an investment takes place very early in the year and the financial statement was not available during the data collection period). Table 2 , Panel B shows mean average coefficients of the five "rolling" regressions for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 . The average models R² range between 43% and 87% and are well above the 3-5% average R² for the "age-only" models in Armstrong et al. (2007) . Hence, our rHGCprojection model should provide much more reliable projections, in particular for firms without any historic revenues information.
----- [TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE] ----- Table 3 reports forecast errors that we obtain from comparisons of management forecasts with our rHGCprojection benchmarks. 2 The management forecasts are highly overestimated and increase from a mean forecast error of 123% for one-year-ahead forecasts to 494% for three-year-ahead forecasts. This provides evidence for overoptimistic and/or overconfident management teams. However, these findings certainly rely on our benchmark projection method. While ex-post realizations are obviously not available before an investment decision we can at least use them to assess the construct validity of our projection approach. Panels B-D of Table 3 account for this aspect, we later also apply Cox proportional hazard models to verify our findings from the probit model. Furthermore, we focus our probit analyses on the first five years following an investment round and define the dependent variable "failure" as equal to one, when a firm fails within the first five years after the investment round. Otherwise, we classify a firm as a non-failure. This also applies for observations for that we can only study less than five years after the investment round as our observation period ends in May 2011, i.e., for investments after May 2007.
----- [TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE] ----- Table 4 reports the results of our failure prediction model based on a probit model. As we require observations with valid forecast errors for our failure risk models (i.e., non-zero rHGC-projections and forecast errors smaller than or equal to +/-2,500 percent). Of this sample, 44 firms later fail and in 53 investment rounds a firm fails within the first five years following the investment. Most importantly, Table 4 , Panel C shows the results of our failure risk assessment model. The effect of the mean3 forecast error is highly statistically significant and positive. Thus, overestimated one-to three-year ahead management forecasts for revenues are related to significantly higher failure risks. In regard of our control variables, we find that a higher cash/total assets ratio significantly decreases failure risks. Furthermore, complete management teams, cooperation partners and higher market growth expectations by the investor lead to significantly lower failure risks. In contrast, firms with a higher number of employees face higher failure risks. All these effects are overall in line with our expectations. However, the absolute level of revenues, prior start-up experience, an innovative product/process, a corporate lead investor, and different levels of funds inflows into the venture capital industry do not exhibit a statistically significant effect on failure risks. For further reference, we also report the marginal effects at the mean. This shows that an increase of 100 percentage points in forecast errors compared to the mean (when holding all other variables constant), roughly increases the failure probability by three percent. We also report the economic effect, which is defined as the marginal effect times the standard error of the explanatory variable. Interestingly, the mean3 forecast error variable and the number of employees exhibit the largest economic effect on failure risk compared to all other control variables. This finding highlights the relevance of overoptimism and overconfidence for failure risk assessments.
-----[TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE] -----
To further validate our findings on the relevance of forecast biases for failure risk assessments we conduct additional survival-time analyses in Table 5 . In Panel A we distinguish the investigated firms in three equal groups depending on the magnitude of their average mean3 forecast across all rounds (see also Puri and Robinson (2007, who distinguish groups according to how respondents judge future economic conditions). In Section 2 we hypothesize that pessimistic and extremely optimistic entrepreneurs should face the highest failure risks. In fact, we observe less failure events than expected for firms with small and medium forecast biases when we apply a log-rank test approach. As only nine firms in our sample provide underestimated management forecasts, we are not able to derive insights into pessimistic entrepreneurs.
But we observe much more failure events than expected for the last third of the firms that exhibit the largest forecast errors. A log-rank test for the equality of the survival functions of these three groups is rejected with a p-value of 0.06. Thus, we conclude that very large forecast errors are associated with significantly higher failure risks. Finally, we also conduct a Cox proportional hazard model. In this model, we investigate a firm performance from the founding date until the end of May 2011 or until the firm fails (regarding the approach see also Mata and Portugal 1994 , Audretsch and Mahmood 1995 , Honjo 2000 , Shumway 2001 ). We treat firms that are still alive at the end of May 2011 as right-censored observations. In Cox proportional hazard models, hazard rates describe the effects of a one unit change in a covariate on the unspecified baseline hazard function as a constant proportional change. Hence, a hazard ratio below one monotonically decreases the baseline hazard (and failure probability) while hazard ratios above one increase failure risks. The results of the Cox proportional hazard model support our previous findings based on probit models regarding the implications of forecast biases. Higher mean3 forecast errors clearly increase the failure probability as we obtain a highly significant and positive coefficient as well as a hazard ratio above one. With regard to the control variables, only cooperation partners and higher market growth expectations still decrease failure risks. Meanwhile, in this model we also observe that an innovative product/process (as defined by the lead investor) decreases failure risks, while corporate lead investors are associated with higher failure risks. All other covariates do not show any statistically significant effects in this survival time analysis. As a final test, we conduct a graphical comparison of smoothed hazard rates. Figure 3 shows the development of smoothed hazard rates for the three groups defined in Table 5 , Panel A. We again distinguish the firms depending on their average forecast error bias across all rounds. While firms with small and medium forecast errors show very comparable smoothed hazard rate estimates, firms with very large forecast errors exhibit much higher smoothed hazard rates and hence, face higher failure risks.
-----[FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE] -----

Robustness Checks
Our findings may be impaired by our dataset or research design. In this regard, we discussed potential selection biases of our data sample in Section 3.2. To further address possible concerns regarding our dataset, we apply a Heckman probit model as a robustness test (Heckman 1979, Van de Ven and Van Praag 1981) . For the selection equation we use a dataset from Thomson VentureXpert (now ThomsonOne). For this test, we randomly collect information on 400 non-KfW investments in the investigated time period. In the selection equation we account for the industry, the yearly German VC fund inflows, and, in particular, for the number of investors as these variables are available for both datasets and should influence the syndication decisions of the investors (Sorenson and Stuart 2001 , Brander et al. 2002 , Hochberg et al. 2007 ). However, we obtain an insignificant rho and are not able to reject the independence of the selection and main equation when using a Wald-test. This finding does not signal a severe selection bias in our data. Regarding our covariates of concern in this model the outcome is not significantly different from our probit model in Table 4 , Panel C (the results are available upon request from the authors).
In our research design, we focus our analyses on averages of one-to three-year forecast errors ("mean3 forecast errors") and do not consider four-and five-year-ahead forecasts of the management.
However, unreported robustness tests show that we obtain almost similar results when we consider averages of one-to five-year-ahead-management forecast errors. In particular, we again find a highly significant positive relationship between forecast errors and failure risks. Furthermore, one may argue why we consider mean average forecast errors per round and do not estimate medians. In this regard, unreported tests show that we also observe a highly statistically significant effect of median forecast errors per round on failure risks in our models.
Conclusions
This study investigates the relevance of overoptimism and overconfidence for failure risks of venturebacked start-ups. In our analyses, we introduce a novel measure that allows investors to identify potential biases in the expectations of the management team before an investment decision. By advancing a revenue projection method of prior research (Armstrong et al. 2007 ), we develop the rHGC-projection method. This enables us to derive projections for future revenues of the investigated start-ups. When we apply these projections as benchmarks for management forecasts and estimate forecast errors, our empirical analyses show that higher levels of forecast bias of the management team result in statistically significant higher failure risks. From all covariates in our comprehensive failure prediction model, which considers several financial and non-financial covariates, average forecast biases even show the economically most important effects on failure risks. Thus, our results clearly highlight that the identification of highly overestimated management forecasts prior to investment decisions can help investors to assess failure risks of their investments.
Our findings contribute to the growing literature on the implications of overoptimism and overconfidence for a firm's performance (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993 , Camerer and Lovallo 1999 , Puri and Robinson 2007 . In addition, the results are relevant for the advancement of existing failure prediction models (Audretsch and Mahmood 1995, Mata and Portugal 2002) as well as for contract design in entrepreneurial environments (Aghion and Bolton 1992 , Kaplan and Strömberg 2003 , De Bettignies 2008 . Our research also provides further insights for the ongoing discussion on the relevance of accounting information and business plans for the success of start-ups and venture capital investments (Castrogiovanni 1996 , Zacharakis and Meyer 2000 , Delmar and Shane 2003 , Brinckmann et al. 2010 , Chwolka and Raith 2012 . Furthermore, our research highlights the importance of taking an "outside view" in venture capital investment situations (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993). Many investors and entrepreneurs may even believe or even be sure that their investment situation is fairly unique and that a projection model based on historical information from a large number of firms is not applicable for their specific situation. However, we observe that our cross-sectional rHGC-method, which builds on historical data from all firms in the dataset, yields revenue projections that come much closer to ex-post realizations of revenues than the individual management forecasts. This supports the argumentation of prior research that "the adoption of an outside view, in which the problem at hand is treated as an instance of a broader category, will generally reduce the optimistic bias and may facilitate the application of a consistent risk policy" (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993, p. 29-30) . Our research may point to directions for future research in that field (e.g., the advanced use of an investor's portfolio data for failure risk assessment). Our findings might also be an opportunity for venture capitalists to learn and further capitalize from failures to improve their future investment decisions (see also Baumard and Starbuck 2005, Cannon and Edmondson 2005) . We conclude with a citation of McGrath (1999, p. 28) , who pointed out: "By carefully analyzing failures instead of focusing only on successes, scholars can begin to make systematic progress on better analytical models of entrepreneurial value creation."
Appendix A. Description of the KfW Investment Program
The KfW Bankengruppe is Germany's largest promotional bank and amongst others, provides financing for young technological companies through their venture capital program since the early 1990s. In 2009 promotional financing of the business area reached a volume of EUR 23.8 billion. Of this sum, commitments for start-up and general investments amounted to EUR 15.5 billion. 3 The current fund providing equity financing to innovative firms younger than 10 years is called the "ERP Start Fund". 4
The Start Fund aims to leverage private equity because it only provides capital if a lead investor is involved. The participation by KfW and the lead investor are subject to the same economic conditions.
Being a purely financial co-investor, KfW does not carry out individual due diligence but rather bases its investment decision on the lead investor's internal documentation and investment evaluation.
KfW demands a thorough due diligence report provided by the lead investor. Additionally, venture
capitalists have to provide all documentation involved in the investment decision. In essence, depending on the age of the company and the number of financing rounds a company has received, this internal documentation, which includes items such as complete due diligence data, and historical financial statement data, often contains several hundred or even thousands of pages per company. b Panel B shows mean average coefficients of the five "rolling" regressions for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 , where each regression only considers historical or contemporaneous information, which are available at the point in time of the investment round. Firm age denotes the firms' age in years, employees denotes the number of employees, and revenues are measured in EUR 1,000. Dummy variables take value one when a firm (at the time of the investment round) is in a specific industry. All regressions use robust standard errors clustered at firm level. *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient differs from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using two-sided t-tests, respectively. We drop observations with forecast errors larger than +/-2,500%, and management forecasts or projected revenues of zero. *, **, *** indicate that mean forecast errors differ from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively (using a two-sided t-test for mean and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for median forecast errors). b Panel B shows descriptive statistics for forecast errors based on two different benchmarks, rolling HGC-projections and ex-post realized data.
c Panel C tests the difference between the two different benchmark measures for revenues by employing a Wilcoxon signed-rank test by forecast horizon (1-year to 3-year-ahead) and for the full sample (sum of 1-to 3-year-ahead forecasts). The null hypothesis is that both error measures are equal.
d Panel D provides results of a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis statistic, which tests the equality-ofpopulations ranks for the two benchmarks for management forecasts for revenues for the full sample (sum of 1-to 3-year-ahead forecasts). b Panel B shows descriptive statistics for the covariates used in the probit model. We estimate mean3 forecast errors as the mean average of the 1-to 3-year-ahead revenue forecast errors (as estimated in Table 3 ). For the estimation of the mean3 averages we ignore revenue forecast errors larger than +/-2,500%. All financial statement items are based on the most recent financial statement immediately prior to the investment. The number of employees and the other firm-related covariates are obtained from the due diligence information available for the investor. Dummy variables take value one when a firm (at the time of the investment round) is run by entrepreneurs with prior start-up experience; has a complete management team (at least a CEO and a CSO); has a cooperation partner; develops an innovative product and/or process (as classified by the investor); has a corporate lead investor; is in a particular industry (results relative to the omitted industry "other"). Market growth expectations depend on the assessment of the lead investor. German VC fund inflows are obtained from BVK 5 statistics and represent the inflows of the four quarters preceding an investment and are log-transformed according to ln [Z+1] . c Panel C shows the results of the probit model by applying robust standard errors clustered at firm level. *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient or a marginal effect (holding all other variables at the mean value) differs from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively (using a two-sided t-test if the expected sign of the coefficient is "+/−" or a one-sided t-test if we provide direction regarding the relative size of the coefficient). We estimate economic effects as the product of the marginal effect times the standard deviation of the variable used in the model. a Panel A distinguishes the investigated firms in three groups depending on the magnitude of the average mean3 forecast errors across all analyzed rounds (for which information regarding the covariates used in the Cox-proportional hazard model is available). For the estimation of the mean3 averages we ignore revenue forecasts errors larger than +/-2,500%. "Failure events expected" is based on Log-rank test for equality of the survival functions.
b Panel B reports results of a Cox-proportional hazard model by applying robust standard errors clustered at firm level. All covariates in the model are defined as in Table 4 . *, **, *** indicate that a coefficient differs from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively (using a two-sided t-test if the expected sign of the coefficient is "+/−" or a one-sided t-test if we provide direction regarding the relative size of the coefficient).
Figure 1 Rolling Historically Grounded Conditional Projections Approach
Notes. This figure illustrates the modeling approach to obtain rolling historically grounded conditional projections. We use model 1a to derive one-year-ahead projections if there are no lagged revenues available. In all other cases we apply model 1b to obtain one-year-ahead projections. Model 2 is applied for two-to three-year-ahead projections. Notes. This graph shows the development of median management forecasts, rHGC-projections and ex-post realizations depending on firm age for 133 observations, where all necessary information is available (as estimated in Table 3 , Panel B). We ignore observations with forecast errors larger than +/-2,500%. Notes. This graph illustrates smoothed hazard rates depending on analysis time and differentiating between three groups for firms with small, medium and large average forecast errors across rounds as defined in Table 5 , Panel A. For the estimation of the average forecast errors we ignore observations with forecast errors larger than +/-2,500%.
